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ABSTRACT Collective memories of totalitarianism and the industrialized slaughter of 
the Holocaust have exerted a profound influence on postwar European politics and 
philosophy. Two of the most prominent political theorists and public intellectuals to take 
up the legacy of total war are Hannah Arendt and Jrgen Habermas. However, their 
prescriptions seem to pull in opposite directions. While Arendt draws on remembrance to 
recover politics on a smaller scale, advocating for the creation of local councils, 
Habermas draws on the past to justify his search for postnational forms of political 
community that can overcome the bloody legacy of nationalism. My argument brings 
these two perspectives together by examining their mutual support for European 
integration as a way of preserving the lessons of total war. I argue that both Habermas 
and Arendt reject the technocratic nature of the EU while maintaining hope that it can 
develop a truly supranational form of politics. 
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The Second World WarÉ[is] a war we forget at our 
own peril. Anyone who thinks that fascism in one guise 
or another is dead and gone ought to think again. 
- Judith Shklar (1998: 4). 
 
Introduction 
Collective memories of EuropeÕs Òage of total warÓ (Black, 2006) Ð spanning two 
global conflicts, the economic hardship of the Great Depression, the rise of 
totalitarianism and the industrialized slaughter of the Holocaust Ð defined European 
politics and society in the postwar era (1945-89). The unprecedented record of death and 
destruction in the first half of the twentieth century has been the dominant imperative for 
change since the end of the Second World War. This motivation has been a particularly 
powerful force in global affairs, as anti-fascism defined domestic and international 
politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain throughout the Cold War (see Lebow et al., 
2006). 
The most notable product of this political agenda from the perspective of 
international political theory is the project of European integration. From its humble 
beginnings as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union 
(EU) has become the greatest experiment in political, social, economic and monetary 
integration Òbeyond the nation-stateÓ (Haas, 1964). As such, it raises fundamental 
questions about many of the basic concepts of politics and international relations, 
including nationalism, citizenship, sovereignty and democracy (see Verovšek, 2017a: 398). 
Despite its ongoing crises at the beginning of the second millennium, looking back on the 
Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, a Òunited EuropeÓ has indeed proven 
Òindispensable to the preservation of peaceÓ by helping overcome the Òage old opposition 
between France and GermanyÓ (Committee on Institutional Affairs, 1982: 47). 
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The postwar imperative for change cannot, of course, reconcile the atrocities of the 
past once and for all. In the words of Max Horkheimer, ÒPast injustice has occurred and 
is completed. The slain are really slainÓ (in Benjamin, 1999: 471) and cannot be brought 
back to life. While those killed by totalitarianism cannot be redeemed, the survivors of 
past on the European continent have sought to give these deaths meaning by drawing on 
their memories of the past to prevent the recurrence of such events in the future.  
Although World War II left painful and divisive memories across Europe, this 
historical legacy is especially powerful in the Federal Republic. The intellectual 
challenge of the Holocaust for GermanyÕs relationship to its cultural tradition is perhaps 
most symbolically obvious in Buchenwald. In the middle of this concentration camp 
(Konzentrationslager), where many Jews, Poles, Slavs and other Òsocial degeneratesÓ had 
labored and died, stood the famous ÒGoethe OakÓ (Goethe-Eiche), where Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe wrote the ÒWandererÕs NightsongÓ (Wanderers Nachtlied) and 
parts of Faust. However, this legacy was tarnished by the fact that the Nazis used the oak 
for torture and hangings before it was destroyed by an allied bomb in 1944 (Hftling Nr. 
4935 [Prisoner #4935], 2006). 
This example is emblematic of the postwar German struggle to approach its past. 
Hannah Arendt and Jrgen Habermas stand out as two of the most prominent public 
intellectuals to take up this problem and its political implications. Although ArendtÕs 
(2006) condemnation of Adolf Eichmann for overseeing the deportation of the Jews by 
the Nazis is her most (in)famous intervention in these debates, she also took strong 
positions on the issue of GermanyÕs collective guilt and responsibility (see Alweiss, 
2003: 307-18), as well as on the important role that history plays in constructing the 
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common world that all individuals share. Similarly, the meaning of the past has been a 
constant theme in all of HabermasÕs writings, culminating in his defense of the 
HolocaustÕs central place in postwar German identity during the Historikerstreit 
(HistoriansÕ Debate) of the mid-1980s (see Baldwin, 1990; Habermas, 1989). 
There is much that unites the views of these two theorists regarding the role that 
this unmastered Ð or perhaps even unmasterable (Maier, 1988) Ð past ought to play in 
postwar social and political life. For instance, even though Arendt tends to speak of 
remembrance while Habermas uses the term collective memory (which he adopts from 
the French social theorist Maurice Halbwachs), both are committed to social contestation 
through dialogue as a way of recovering and learning from the experienced past.1 Arendt 
and Habermas also agree that shared historical imaginaries are crucial in linking disparate 
individuals together within the common, globalized world world that has developed with 
the onset of modernity and the technological revolutions it has brought with it (see 
Marcuse, 1977). 
However, in addition to these similarities there are a number of substantive 
differences between their positions as well. Most notably, unlike Arendt, whose 
theoretical ideals are drawn from her analysis of the Greek city-state Ð prompting one 
unsympathetic commentator to accuse her of Òpolis envyÓ (Wolin, 2001) Ð HabermasÕ 
engagement with the importance of collective memory stretches far beyond the city. He 
calls instead for the formation of a new Òpostnational constellationÓ (2001) where states 
relate to each other not through international politics, but through a global domestic 
policy mediated by supranational institutions. 
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From this perspective their prescriptions for political life in the aftermath of the 
Second World War seem to go in opposite directions. While Arendt seeks to recover 
politics on a smaller scale, where local councils debate issues directly, Habermas 
explicitly searches for new, more globalized forms of political community as the way to 
overcome the debilitating power of nationalism. Although Arendt seeks to Òscale downÓ 
to the local level while Habermas wants to Òscale upÓ beyond the nation-state, my basic 
thesis is that their work can be brought together in their shared desire to root a new 
postwar politics of memory in the European project of integration.  
In mobilizing support for the postwar European movement, Arendt and Habermas 
both frame the problem of dealing with the Nazi past not only as one of German 
intellectual history, but also as a key issue for international political theory in the wake of 
total war. However, whereas Habermas focuses almost exclusive on the legacy of the 
Holocaust, Arendt tends to speak of the remembrance of totalitarianism more broadly. At 
a time when divisions between the ÒoldÓ founding states and the Ònew,Ó postcommunist 
members from East-Central Europe is increasingly dividing the EU (see Verovšek, 2015: 
542-6), I conclude by suggesting that ArendtÕs more holistic vision, which allows for 
memories of both fascism and communism to drive the projet europen, may have certain 
advantages. 
The argument is organized as follows. In the first section, I demonstrate the 
importance of remembrance in ArendtÕs theoretical system, focusing in particular on the 
influence of the polis and the importance of storytelling (see also Verovšek 2014b). Even 
though the concentration camp symbolizes the danger of the loss of memory, Arendt does 
not focus exclusively on its application by the Nazis in the west, but also on its 
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deployment by the communist regimes of the east. In part two I then show why Habermas 
thinks that the memories of World War II Ð contained in the paradigmatic example of 
Auschwitz Ð should form the basis for a federated, supranational community that exists 
both above and alongside existing European states. 
In the third section I bring these reflections together by examining how these two 
seemingly opposed perspectives can be brought together. Insodoing, I highlight their 
surprising agreement on the potential of the Ònew regionalismÓ (Tel, 2001) of the 
European project as meso-level of politics that can preserve the lessons of the past. I 
conclude by noting that both Arendt and Habermas reject the technocratic nature of the 
EU Ð which has become particularly visible in the aftermath of the so-called Great 
Recession (2008-13) Ð while maintaining hope that it could develop a truly postnational 
form of political debate and decision-making. I also suggest that ArendtÕs more holistic 
focus on the memories of totalitarianism may have certain advantages over HabermasÕs 
more narrow emphasis on the centrality of the Holocaust at a time when the EU is 
expanding into areas of Europe whose memory cultures are defined more by their 
experience of communism than fascism. 
  
Arendt on the Polis and the Council System 
Born in 1906 to a Jewish-German family, Arendt experienced the rise of Hitler and 
the horrors of World War II as an adult. ArendtÕs flight from Germany without papers in 
1933 forced her to confront important political issues of citizenship, statelessness and 
belonging Ð as well as of the legacy of totalitarianism more generally Ð on both a 
personal and a theoretical level (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 115-63). Her memories of the 
Third Reich caused her to question much of the history of political thought, which she 
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argued was tainted by the events of 1914-1945. As a political theorist Ð not a political 
philosopher, a label she rejected due to its connection with the philosophical tradition Ð 
she sought a new grounding for politics in the postwar world. 
Arendt builds her conception of the political on a reinterpretation of the Greek polis 
(city-state) as the first site of politics, understood literally as referring to Òthe affairs of 
the polis.Ó She argues that rethinking the concepts of ancient philosophy is crucial in a 
world that has experienced totalitarianism. Revisiting the past with new eyes has the 
potential to dismiss Òthe mindless peace of complacencyÓ (Arendt, 1977a: 38) that made 
the radical but simultaneously banal, bureaucratized evil of Nazism possible.  
Based on her reconstruction of ancient Greek political thought, Arendt argues that 
Òwords and deedsÓ are the key feature of Òthe human condition,Ó the title of her major 
theoretical work on politics. Words and deeds are crucial because distinguish individuals 
both from each other and from the rest of the living world: ÒIn acting and speaking, men 
show who they are, reveal[ing] actively their unique personal identitiesÓ (Arendt, 1998: 
179). Although everybody labors to take care of their physical needs and works to 
produce tools and other artifacts, the separation of unique individuals from the masses of 
human beings is possible only as a result of Òwords and deeds,Ó action in ArendtÕs 
terminology. Through Òaction in concertÓ individuals cease to be defined by work or 
labor, and become political beings, living and defining themselves vis--vis others.2 
The importance of words and deeds in the creation of unique identities highlights 
the crucial role of storytelling in preserving these markers of individuality beyond those 
that witnessed them directly. On one level, storytelling is necessary to spread the effects 
of action horizontally throughout the entire community. On a deeper level, however, it is 
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the function of history to take words and deeds out of the recurring cycle of the natural 
world in order to preserve these achievements for posterity. Storytelling makes memory 
tangible and reveals the meaning of the past. However, it remains dependent on the 
presence of others. Political communities, where individuals live together and pursue 
common goals as citizens, therefore assume a central role in preserving the past and 
endowing it with meaning. 
Arendt argues that it is only through the shared human capacity for speech that 
individuals are able to build common worlds together. Words and deeds transform a 
group into a communitas, a Òunion with.Ó This unity of individuals bound together by a 
common fellow feeling is the basis for political life. She traces the creation of the 
political realm back to the Greek city-state. Arendt (1998: 194-5) notes, ÒBefore men 
began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent 
actions could take place, the space being the public realm of the polis.Ó 
The polis and other political communities serve the dual function of making 
remembrance possible in the present and of reifying these memories into more 
permanent, tangible structures. They create a safe haven for individuals that protects them 
from both internal and external violence; they provide a stable home for action. By 
ensuring the safety of its members, the polity guarantees that witnesses will be present to 
testify to the great words and deeds of unique individuals. In this way, ÒThe polis was 
supposed to multiply the occasions to win Ôimmortal fame,Õ that is, to multiply the 
chances for everyone to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his 
unique distinctnessÓ (Arendt, 1998: 197). 
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The community not only provides witnesses; it also Òfabricates memoryÓ (Arendt, 
1977b: 64) so words and deeds can outlive their authors and the original witnesses. Its 
laws and institutions concretize past acts and make them immortal: ÒWhat saves the 
affairs of mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but this incessant talk about 
them, which in its turn remains futile unless certain concepts, certain guideposts for 
future remembrance, and even for sheer reference, arise out of itÓ (Arendt, 1990: 220). 
The polis is the structure that provides these guideposts; it creates what Arendt calls Òthe 
common worldÓ that gives action meaning. In both its physical structure and its political 
legacy Ð reflected in laws, statutes and records Ð the polity Òis a kind of organized 
remembranceÓ (Arendt, 1998: 198). 
Through storytelling and political communities such as the polis, men assure that 
their great words and deeds do not die. By reifying memory into concrete, tangible 
objects that range from physical monuments and memorials to words on a page, the 
storyteller and the community give acts a durability that is not possible otherwise. While 
those outside the polis depend on poets to gain immortality, the political community 
guarantees that action will endure without depending on bards to sing and listeners to 
hear the stories chronicling their deeds. Although storytelling is a powerful ability, the 
narrative and the memories it preserves would not have the same longevity without the 
ultimate Òsitus of memoryÓ (Kohn, 2000: 125), the polis. 
What Arendt found most frightening about the rise of totalitarianism in both its 
communist and its fascist variants is its embrace of a conception of society where 
everyone is unified into a single body politic that thinks and acts as one (Lederman, 
2016). The plurality of unique persons living within a given territory is reduced to one 
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man, das Volk  (Òthe people,Ó a singular noun in German), i.e. the individual is subsumed 
within the corporate state. In order to achieve this goal, Arendt argues that totalitarianism 
seeks to destroy the preconditions of action: plurality and Òthe gift of memory so 
dangerous to totalitarian ruleÓ (1951: 434). In contrast to the Òwords and deedsÓ of the 
polis, the administrative approach adopted by totalitarianism Òsubstitutes for the 
boundaries and channels of communication between individual men a band of iron which 
holds them so tightly together that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into One 
man of gigantic dimensionsÓ (Arendt, 1951: 465-6). The spontaneity of human action is 
replaced by mechanistic conceptions of nature and history. 
The attempts of the totalitarian state to eliminate plurality, memory and action is 
most visible in the operations of the extermination or death camps (Vernichtungslager). 
These institutions are unprecedented because they not only try to rid the world of certain 
individuals and classes within society, but do so in a way that Òmiraculously sees to it 
that the victim never existed at allÓ (Arendt, 1951: 434-5). In order to do so, the camps 
Òmak[e] death itself anonymousÓ (Ibid: 452) by taking away the individualÕs unique 
identity. The personÕs name (contained on official documents) and personal belongings 
are replaced by a number and a uniform; the unique individual ceases to be a person and 
becomes one more thing among many, a number on a document, a part of the 
homogenized collective. 
This approach is not restricted to the West or to the Nazi regime. On the contrary, it 
is shared by totalitarianism in both its fascist and its communist forms. The Soviet gulag 
thus serves the same purpose as the Nazi concentration camp, both of which sought to 
take advantage of anonymous inmates as sources of inexpensive labor power, while also 
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sharing some features of the death camps. Most notably, all of these totalitarian 
institutions seek to destroy individuality, making the victim disappear both as a physical 
body on the earth and from the memories of others in the shared human world. Much like 
purged members of the Communist Party who later disappeared from photographs under 
Stalin, the victim seems never to have existed at all. In The Origins of Totalitarianism 
Arendt quotes two victims of the Great Purge (1937-38) in the Soviet Union, who report 
that Òif it is true that elephants never forget, Russians seem to us to be the very opposite 
of elephantsÉ. Soviet Russian psychology seems to make forgetfulness really possibleÓ 
(in Beck and Godin, 1951: 234, 127). 
Building on Arendt, Timothy Snyder (2016) argues, ÒIn order to kill a person, you 
have to kill the juridical person first − you need to remove the law from the person you 
are killing.Ó Once the person ceases to exist on paper Ð i.e. in the eyes of the law and the 
gaze of the state Ð killing the physical individual is easy. The ÒmereÓ or ÒbareÓ human 
being that remains when the juridical person has been disposed of can disappear without 
a trace within an Òorganized oblivion thatÉextends even to the families and friends of 
the victimÓ (Arendt, 1951: 452). In contrast to the Òorganized remembranceÓ of the 
political community, totalitarianism seeks Òorganized oblivion.Ó 
Despite ArendtÕs status as the Òthinker of the polisÓ (Sternberger, 1980), Christian 
Volk (2017: 172) points out that in addition to this theoretical resource, her thought also 
draws on her memories of Òthe downfall of a European order based on the nation-state, 
the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of National Socialism.Ó In order to 
respond to the horrors of totalitarianism, Arendt had to find a way to reassert plurality. 
However, she could not do so without Òthe saving power of remembrance, which helps us 
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preserve what would otherwise be lost to timeÓ (Beiner, 1982: 155). Although words and 
deeds lie at the root of human existence, they would be meaningless and futile without 
the gift of memory. If people could not preserve their past interactions with other human 
beings, they would be doomed to appear in the world for a fleeting moment, only to 
disappear again in a never-ending cycle. Individuals would have neither a past nor a 
future: ÒWithout remembranceÉthe living activities of action, speech, and thought would 
lose their reality at the end of each process and disappear as though they never had beenÓ 
(Arendt, 1998: 95). 
However, while Arendt needed to find a way to reassert memory, in the aftermath 
of the crimes of totalitarianism and the atrocities of the Holocaust she also knew that it 
was impossible to simply go back to the status quo ante. As a result, Arendt interpreted 
totalitarianism and the events of the late 1930s and early 1940s as a crucial break in 
history that made a simplistic reliance on time-honored forms of authority untenable. 
Unlike some survivors, who sought relief from the horrors of the past in forgetting, 
Arendt maintains a belief in the importance remembrance and the dangers of oblivion 
(see Benhabib, 2003: 91). Even though Òwe have ceased to live in a common world 
where the words we have in common possess an unquestionable meaningfulnessÓ 
(Arendt, 1977b: 95), she argues that this does not mean that the past is no longer 
important or that there is no long any meaning to be found in history. On the contrary, 
Arendt repeatedly warns of the dangers of destroying memory. 
Arendt argues that preserving Òthe pre-existence of a common worldÓ (1998: 465) 
through remembrance is crucial not only for the formal legal communities of the modern 
state system, but also for the creation of a broader sense of community that encompasses 
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the entire globe. Although the progress of natural science has resulted in Òthe decisive 
shrinkage of the earth,Ó Arendt worries that these gains have been won at Òthe price of 
putting a decisive distance between man and earth, of alienating man from his immediate 
earthly surroundingsÓ (Arendt, 1998: 251). This alienation from the physical earth itself 
is dangerous in an age when humanity has the ability to destroy its environment both 
through the use of the atom bomb and environmental destruction on a global scale. In 
ArendtÕs analysis this Òearth alienationÓ is accompanied by a Òworld alienationÓ of 
individuals from each other. Thus, instead of becoming Òcitizens of the worldÓ who can 
confront global problems, Òthe eclipse of the common worldÓ has instead led to Òthe 
formation of the lonely mass manÓ incapable of action to preserve either the common 
world of the common earth (Arendt, 1998: 257).3 
In order to combat these trends Ð which both helped to produce totalitarianism and 
were exacerbated by it Ð Arendt maintains that individuals re-establishing bonds that cut 
across social and generational boundaries. Instead of leaving the past behind, she 
encouraged the survivors of EuropeÕs age of total war to rethink the relationship between 
the past and the present. While the past usually limits the range of possible plotlines, 
during moments of crisis memory can also provide the resources needed to think political 
action anew (see Verovšek, 2020). 
This approach builds on ArendtÕs reading of Walter Benjamin.4 In his ÒTheses on 
the Philosophy of HistoryÓ (1940), Benjamin argues that violent historical ruptures 
destroy existing narrative, leaving only fragments of the past behind. Arendt builds on 
this point, arguing that the aftermath of ÒBenjaminian momentsÓ (Benhabib, 2012: 31-3) 
of crisis that tear the existing narratives of history asunder, the survivors must imitate the 
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actions of a pearl diver, who searches the depths for bits of the past that have 
ÒÕundergone a sea-changeÕ and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain 
immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diverÉ[to] bring them 
up into the world of the livingÓ (1977a: 51). Even through totalitarianism had broken Òthe 
continuity of Occidental historyÓ (1977b: 26), Arendt argues that in its aftermath 
individuals must search for bits and pieces of the past that can use to make politics 
meaningful for the present.  
This fragmentary historical methodology allows Arendt to convert memory into 
something applicable to the present. Unlike the organic stories and myths of German 
nationalism that had fueled the onset of two World Wars, this Benjaminan relationship to 
the past is reflexive and contested. Such a historical imaginary would have to be non-
violent, drawing its power from Òthe human ability not just to act but to act in concertÓ 
(Arendt, 1970: 41) Ð an ability made possible by the power of words to convince 
individuals to cooperate of their own free will. 
This fragmentary, Òpearl-divingÓ methodology necessitated by the experience of 
totalitarianism leads her to argue in favor of a new localized politics in the form of a 
council system, which was until recently Òa relatively neglected theme in the scholarly 
literature on ArendtÓ (Lederman, 2016: 504). She is highly critical of the liberal-
democratic and Marxist conceptions of the state, both of which crush popular 
participation either through the operation of a strong party system or the domination of 
the public sphere by the Communist Party. Instead of following either of these traditions, 
Arendt develops her own understanding of the importance of direct citizen participation 
in revolutionary moments by drawing on a number of disparate resources. These include 
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Thomas JeffersonÕs ideas for the development of a ward system, the American 
Revolution, the Paris Commune of 1789, the creation of soviets in the first days of the 
Russian Revolution in 1917, the 1919 Spatacist Uprising (Spartakusaufstand) led by 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht she experienced as a child in Germany, the Jewish 
kibbutzim she saw during her trip to Palestine in 1935, and the councils formed during the 
short-lived Hungarian Revolution of 1956.  
In all of these cases, Arendt argues that local councils Òconcerned with the 
reorganization of the political and economic life of the country and the establishment of a 
new world orderÓ were not planned, but instead Òsprang from the people as spontaneous 
organs of action and of orderÓ (Arendt, 1990: 263). Although the dominance of the Party 
or of the party system inevitably doomed these local institutions, they are ÒpearlsÓ with 
the potential to create a new mode of networked politics. These small Òspaces of 
freedom,Ó in which every citizen is able to take part, have the potential preserve politics 
and action in communities larger than the polis, at least in principle.  
The fact that revolutionary councils were best preserved in AmericaÕs federal 
system of self-government explains why the US remained a beacon of hope for Arendt 
throughout her life (see Arendt, 1990: 156-70). In reflecting on the legacy and 
imperatives of totalitarianism, she concludes that humanity must return to a fully 
participatory, localized politics in councils that mirror the human potential for action 
most clearly revealed in the polis. Much as the kibbutzim could form the nucleus for the 
new Jewish homeland of ArendtÕs (2007: 349-50, 395, 400) unorthodox Zionist vision, so 
the model of councils more broadly could form the backbone for a new politics for the 
postwar world. 
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HabermasÕs Move Beyond the Nation-State 
Although he is 23 years ArendtÕs junior, Habermas also experienced Nazism first 
hand, even getting called up to deploy in order to defend the homeland with the Hitler 
Youth in the final days of World War II. Surveying the physical, moral and political ruin 
of Germany in its Stunde null Ð the Òzero hourÓ of utter destruction Ð Habermas knew 
that his country would have to learn from this tragedy in order to reclaim its intellectual 
tradition and its place in global society. Looking back on this crucial moment, he notes 
that Òthe rhythm of my personal development intersected with the great historical events 
of the timeÉ. These experiences undoubtedly helped develop motifs which then further 
determined my thinkingÓ (1992: 77). 
Much like Arendt, HabermasÕs project also starts with Òwords and deeds,Ó although 
he prefers to speak of Òlinguistically mediated communication.Ó He agrees with Arendt 
that political power is not drawn from force or violence, but is a product of our ability to 
speak and persuade each other Ð our Òability not just to act but to act in concertÓ (Arendt, 
1970: 41). However, he (Habermas, 1983: 178) rejects her Òrigid conceptual dichotomies 
between ÔpublicÕ and Ôprivate,Õ state and economy, liberty and welfare.Ó Instead of 
limiting the space of politics, he expands it outward to encompass new forms of political 
community after World War II. 
HabermasÕ core philosophical insight is that the essential feature of language is 
communication, which raises us out of nature and makes us conscious moral agents. This 
is the basis of social interaction. Language as Òcommunicative actionÓ cannot only be 
used objectively to refer to states of the world and subjectively to reflect personal 
experiences, but also intersubjectively 
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interpersonal relationships between individuals. The ultimate arbiter of the validity of 
these claims is the ability of the participants to defend their claims with reasons, i.e. Òin 
terms of the capacity of responsible participants in interaction to orient themselves in 
relation to validity claims geared to intersubjective recognitionÓ (Habermas, 1987: 314). 
The space and reach of this communicative politics is not limited as in Arendt, nor is it as 
agonistic and rhetorical. Instead, Habermas (1995: 129) argues for a Òshifting boundary 
between the private and public spheresÓ legitimized by discourse within the political 
community. 
By framing his social theory in universal terms, Habermas retains the ability Ð 
indeed the responsibility Ð of combating relativism. Grounding a substantive, non-
instrumental form reason in universal rules of discourse allows Habermas to criticize and 
struggle against totalitarian policies and authoritarian forms of government, which restrict 
intersubjective action and argumentation. Since arguments are deployed to persuade 
others, speakers inevitably are forced to tacitly acknowledge that these norms are valid 
for everyone. Communicative action, the discursive process of criticizing and giving 
reasons for particular claims, can lead rational individuals to universal norms. Instead of 
the friends and enemies created in EuropeÕs experience of total war (see Schmitt, 2007), 
HabermasÕs Òtalk centricÓ rather than Òvote centricÓ (Scudder, 2016: 524) approach to 
politics is supposed to bring individuals together across borders and without regard for 
the status of the individual (unlike voting, which is only open to citizens, participation in 
the public sphere is usually open to all). 
The ability of participants in discourse to come to Òmutual understandingÓ 
(Verstndigung) about their goals and desires is crucial for any political community. It is 
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this ability and the shared Òwe-perspectiveÓ it encourages that allows individuals form 
communities bound by ties of solidarity, without which Òintelligent action [remains] 
permanently foundationless and inconsequentialÓ (Habermas, 1994: 96). Traditionally, 
these ties dissipated fairly quickly, not extending much beyond the village or the polis. 
With the advent of nationalism in the nineteenth century, combined with the empowering 
of the state through railroads and schools, however, nation-states were able to extend the 
circle of solidarity to include their co-nationals, who shared linguistic, cultural and 
historical bonds (see Weber, 1976). The creation of the demos was thus requires the 
creation of a Òstate-constituting peopleÓ (Habermas, 2006b: 305), a process that is 
achieved in large part through the narratives of collective memory that are contained 
within Òstories of peoplehoodÓ (Smith, 2003). In this way Ð much like Arendt Ð 
Habermas also seeks to link his communicative theory of politics to the remembrance of 
a concrete political community. 
While extending the ties of solidarity to the state certainly had its advantages, it is 
also exclusionary and dangerous. Habermas (1998: 142) observes, ÒThe formation of 
nation-states under the banner of ethnonationalism has almost always been accompanied 
by bloody purification rituals.Ó A brief glance at the history of European nationalism 
before 1945 shows how the desire for ethnic purity resulted in repeated rounds of forced 
emigration, expulsion, disenfranchisement and extermination culminating in genocide. 
Arendt (1951: ch. 9) argues that the existence of stateless persons, refugees, and those 
deprived of their Òright to have rightsÓ is crucial to understanding the origins of 
totalitarianism in Europe. Habermas (1996: 508) agrees, noting that her diagnosis has 
Òproved frighteningly accurate.Ó Although he concurs with ArendtÕs analysis of the 
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concentration camp as the key institution of totalitarianism, Habermas focuses almost 
exclusively on the crimes committed by the Nazis in the Holocaust (see Baldwin, 1990). 
Much like Arendt, Habermas sees power (Macht) as rooted in the human ability to 
use reason and arguments to create bonds of solidarity.5 This kind of societal dialogue is 
especially important if we are to Òlearn from catastropheÓ (Habermas, 2001: 26-37) by 
building on the collective memories of the Holocaust. Habermas personally experienced 
and played a role in the transformation of German identity that took place after the fall of 
the Third Reich. For him, postwar West Germany proves that identity can be reformed 
and rebuilt by taking a reflexive distance from the past. After the horrors of National 
Socialism, he argues that Òour patriotism cannot hide the fact that in Germany democracy 
has taken root in the motives and hearts of the citizensÉafter Auschwitz Ð and in a way 
only through the shock of the moral catastropheÓ (Habermas, 1990: 152). The desire to 
learn from the past while avoiding the pitfalls of the organic conceptions of history and 
peoplehood propagated by the Nazi regime is what led Habermas to seek an Òactive 
remembrance Ð working through [aufarbeiten] the past and hoping for a better futureÓ 
(Matuštk, 2001: 10). 
The problems caused by overlaying the demos onto the ethnos, of the fellow citizen 
onto the fellow national Ð of the fact that Òthe nation conquered the state,Ó as Arendt 
(1951: 275) famously puts it Ð are clearly visible in German history. In the nineteenth 
century, many leading German intellectuals, including Jakob Grimm, Friedrich and 
August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Alexander von Humboldt, all 
sought a ground for German identity. The possible borders of the state were particularly 
problematic. GermanyÕs unification under Prussia in 1871 proved unsatisfactory, as many 
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groups perceived to be part of das deutsche Volk were still stranded in areas beyond the 
borders of the Reich. It was the desire to unify the whole German people within the 
German state that drove the expansionist drive that defined period of total war in Europe. 
The post-World War I democratic experiment of the Weimar Republic failed. It 
was not until after the even greater disaster of the Third Reich that Germany, at least its 
Western half, was able to embrace a less nationalistic mode of politics. With the tragedy 
of Nazism and World War II, Habermas observes, ÒGermans have lost the possibility of 
grounding their political identity on anything else than the universalistic principles of 
state citizenshipÉnational traditions cannot be appropriated unreflectively, but only 
critically and self-criticallyÓ (in Matuštk, 2001: 173).  
Habermas personally experienced the transformation of German identity that took 
place after the fall of Hitler. Reflecting back on Òthe experience of 1945 and after,Ó he 
(1992: 126) notes that in addition to his rejection of nationalism and violence, he retained 
something else, Ònamely that things got better. Things really got rather better. One must 
use that as a starting-point too.Ó Post-World War II West Germany proves that identity 
can be reformed and rebuilt by reflecting on Òthe better traditions of our history, a history 
that is not unexamined but instead appropriated criticallyÓ (Habermas, 1989: 234). This 
kind of learning process (Lernproze§) requires full engagement with the tragedies and 
traumas of the past, not their silencing or repression. 
Although his commitment to Òconstitutional patriotismÓ (Verfassungpatriotismus) 
is often criticized for being too abstract and formalistic, it is rooted in the particular 
historical experiences of different peoples, who have to reflect upon and critically ÒfilterÓ 
their traditions through the negative reference points of their past communal crimes 
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(2000: 93-8; Mller, 2007). Instead of homogenizing identity, this form of patriotism 
binds specific communities together through their Òanamnestic solidarityÓ (Habermas, 
2002: 129-38) Ð i.e., through their collective task of remembering the dead and ensuring 
that they do not repeat their past crimes Ð not through pre-political characteristics like 
birth, nationality or ethnicity. 
Habermas (1976: 115) argues that the history of nineteenth and twentieth century 
Europe shows us that these Òpre-established identities have become obsolete.Ó It is not 
just Germany that needs to learn from its past Ð all of Europe and the world as a whole 
does as well. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism in Europe, 
Habermas (2005: 12) has sought to ground the lessons of a Òbellicose past [that] 
entangled all European nations in bloody conflictsÓ in political communities beyond the 
nation-state, most notably in the EU.  
Since its start in the 1950s, the European project has built on the desire to secure 
peace in Europe after the horrors of World War II and the divisions wrought by the Cold 
War. ÒIt is memory of the moral abyss into which the excesses of nationalism led us that 
lends our current commitment [to peace and unification] the status of an 
accomplishment,Ó Habermas (2006c: 105) notes. ÒThis historical background could serve 
to smooth the transition to a postnational democracy founded on mutual recognition of 
the differences between proud national cultures.Ó Instead of building on differences, a 
common European identity can be formed through a narrative of learning from history to 
respect human rights, abide by the rule of law and refrain from violence. Only in this way 
can the tragedies of the past can serve as the foundation for a new, post-totalitarian 
politics.  
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With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, this project is no longer limited to the 
west, but can and should be shared by all of Europe. This is a moral and political 
imperative, since it alone can prevent future wars and aggression on the continent, as well 
as in the world more generally. Habermas therefore argues, ÒThe twentieth century puts 
at risk its future by not learning from Ð by badly forgetting Ð its own disasterÓ (in 
Matuštk, 2001: 139). Unfortunately, in making this argument Habermas makes no 
mention of the gulag or the Soviet Union, focusing instead on the Holocaust and the 
actions of the National Socialist regime. Although this position makes sense from his 
position within the postwar Federal Republic, it weakens its appeal in the new, 
postcommunist member-states of East-Central Europe (see Verov!ek, 2015: 542-6). 
This oversight in his application of his ideas, however, does not mean that 
HabermasÕs argument is wrong. It just means that it is too narrowly applied. Although he 
agrees that more needs to be done to create a European identity strong enough to 
empower the EU, he sees clear signs of its existence in the world today. He notes, 
Ò[F]eatures of a common political mentality have taken shape, so that others often 
recognize us as Europeans, rather than as Germans or French Ð and that happens not just 
in Hong Kong, but even in Tel AvivÓ (Habermas, 2005: 9). He identifies a number of 
markers of this nascent European identity, most importantly an aversion to the use of 
force and desire for multi-lateral diplomacy conducted through the United Nations. While 
this kind of identity would clearly be a construction, this is not a problem as long as 
Europeans themselves actively endorse it. The appropriation of the common experience 
of the horrors of nationalism is hardly arbitrary Ð on the contrary, it is completely 
necessary. 
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Despite the fact that Habermas focuses of the collective memories of Western 
Europeans in constructing this argument, its implications are not limited to Europe. 
Habermas contends that the legacy of violence and nationalism on this continent can 
serve as an example to the rest of the world. This explains his recent forays into 
international political theory (Lundestad and Kjartan, 2011). Building on KantÕs famous 
essay ÒTowards Perpetual PeaceÓ (1795) Ð which is also a core touchstone for Arendt Ð 
Habermas (2006b: 503) argues for the creation of Òregionally comprehensive regimes 
like the European CommunityÓ around the world. By encouraging the creation of broad, 
non-nationalist identities, these continental regimes could help safeguard peace and 
prevent atrocities within their borders and externally by cooperating in peacekeeping and 
protecting human rights through the United Nations. This is the key step he takes using 
the memory of war and atrocity in Europe to push politics ÒupÓ beyond the traditional 
political boundaries of the Westphalian state. The EU does so Ð aspirationally at least Ð 
both institutionally and through the creation of a transnational European public sphere 
(Abbott, 2016). 
 
Compatible Forms of Postwar Global Federalism 
Despite their broad agreements about communicative basis of politics, the 
importance of Òaction in concert,Ó the dangers of the nation-state, the threat of 
totalitarianism, and the importance of the collective memory of these historical events, 
Arendt and Habermas seem to draw conflicting lessons from the interwar crisis and the 
experience of two World Wars. Although both argue that the concrete experience of the 
concentration camp Ð contained either in the paradigmatic image of Auschwitz 
(Habermas) or within the broader phenomenon of totalitarianism (Arendt) Ð require a 
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rethinking of political life, they move in opposite directions. In particular, Arendt 
mobilizes the memory of European history to move towards local politics, i.e. towards 
institutions, organizations and associations that promoted direct participation of the 
people and Òwhose units might be both horizontally and vertically connected, related to 
or dependent on one anotherÓ (Wellmer, 2000: 224). By contrast, Habermas seeks to 
address the problems of world politics by placing the nation-state within regional 
Òcontinental regimes,Ó of which the EU is the example par excellence. He (Habermas, 
2006a: 136) argues that regimes at this transnational, meso-level will be able to promote 
an Òactively rebalanced world orderÓ that would prevent the horrors of totalitarianism 
from recurring. 
Despite these differences, I argue that it is possible to bring these divergent stands 
of thought together by examining the support both of these thinkers offer for the 
European project as part of a broader reorganization and reconceptualization of 
international politics in the wake of the Second World War. Although Habermas 
criticizes Arendt of over-ontologizing and of creating political categories that are too 
rigid, he does not take issue in principle with her call for more direct, inclusive forms of 
politics. On the contrary, he favors and encourages direct participation in democratic life 
through processes of deliberation. While he has argued that citizens can and should be 
involved in the governing of larger units, he would welcome a renewed, localized 
politics, as long as it was able to function meaningfully under conditions of globalization 
and was able to combat the disastrous consequences of nationalism. 
HabermasÕs own proposals for a Òconstitutionalization of international lawÓ based 
on a Òdemocratically constituted world society without a world governmentÓ retain an 
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important role for existing communities. This system depends on universal norms, which 
are determined at the global level through both formal international law and informal 
customary norms. However, formal enforcement is carried out by legitimate systems of 
coercion that are Òclosely linked in the historical form of the constitutional stateÓ 
(Habermas, 2008c: 445). In many cases, these mechanisms are further devolved to local 
authorities, which decide which laws to enforce and how to institutionalize them (for 
more, see Verovšek, 2017b). 
In addition to taking advantage of local institutions, Habermas also seeks to build 
on the historical reservoirs of civic solidarity contained within existing polities. He fears 
that scrapping local politics in favor of a globalized system will leave individuals in a 
state of Durkheimian anomie where they lack the communal ties necessary for 
socialization and the development of meaningful identities. Without the social bonds 
created by politics at the community level, Habermas argues that citizens will loose the 
collective power to combat the rise of the powerful forces of the neoliberal economic 
system. His endorsement of the importance of local politics, even within an increasingly 
globalized and constitutionalized postnational constellation, already brings his thought 
closer to ArendtÕs. 
In between these two levels, he (Habermas, 2008a: 324-5) argues that Òregional or 
continental regimesÓ can help to set institutional frameworks for norm implementation at 
the meso-level. These structures are meant to fill the political and legal gap between the 
local and the global. Since regions often share a historical experiences and other shared 
cultural markers, such continental regimes could ensure that global debates about the 
implementation of basic international norms were carried out in Òthe intermediate arena 
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[that] is populated by a manageable number of global players.Ó These actors would help 
to ensure that international norms agreed upon at the global level received historically 
and culturally sensitive and enforceable interpretations at the transnational level. 
The EU is the prototype of a continental regime. The common identity and shared 
legal structures Europeans have forged since 1945 as a result of their shared experience 
of total war is a model for other regions. The fact that the EU often acts in the name of all 
its members in global negotiations on issues as diverse as trade and climate change shows 
how such institutions can act as a stepping stone towards a Kantian global domestic 
policy (Weltinnenpolitik). For Habermas, the European Òtransition from classical 
international law to what Kant saw as the Ôcosmopolitan conditionÕÓ (2006a: 19) builds 
directly on the Ònegative point of referenceÓ (2008b: 21) represented by the Holocaust.  
In contrast to Habermas, Arendt never set out an institutional design or structure for 
world federalism. In fact, she was notoriously suspicious of such frameworks, noting, 
ÒNobody can be a citizen of the world as he is a citizen of his countryÓ (Arendt, 1968: 
81). Given the emphasis she places on Òplurality, diversity and mutual limitations,Ó 
Arendt was also suspicious of attempts to globalize politics or to create an international 
public sphere. However, despite her wariness, Patricia Owens (2007: 146) points out, ÒA 
federated political structure more akin to KantÕs Ôrepublic of republicsÕ is certainly 
compatible with her views.Ó In fact, something along these lines might be precisely what 
she had in mind when she endorsed the Òframework of universal agreementsÓ (Arendt, 
1968: 93) laid out in the writings of Karl Jaspers, her doctoral supervisor and friend. 
ArendtÕs support of a loose global federalism is somewhat unexpected given her 
commitment to local politics. It is hard to draw firm conclusions about her thought on this 
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topic, as she Ònever clearly and systematically set out her thought in this areaÓ (Owens, 
2010: 73). However, the fact that she felt compelled to move in this direction is 
understandable given the increasing globalization of a world in which humans walk on 
the moon and humanity has developed the ability to destroy itself. It may be that her 
moves towards a form of global federalism are an attempt to bring a much-needed dose 
of realism into the basic insights of her council model, which otherwise Òseems to fly in 
the face of the realities of the modern worldÓ (Benhabib, 2003: 165). 
On my reading, ArendtÕs concessions to the need for international cooperation in 
the postwar world do not negate her support for the council model. However, they do 
show that she recognizes that the local cannot and should not be the only level of political 
life given the dangers of both world- and earth-alienation in the postwar world. On the 
contrary, councils are but one level in a broader system linking individuals around the 
world to each other both horizontally and vertically. As James Muldoon (2016: 789) 
points out, ÒThe councils are the only new form of government of the twentieth century 
that provides Arendt with hope for the stabilization of political freedom within a lasting 
political regime.Ó 
It is difficult to know exactly what Arendt would have thought of the EU. At the 
time of her death in 1975, the EU was still known as the EEC (European Economic 
Communities), a relatively circumscribed organization that sought to preserve peace in 
Europe by creating a common market for the crucial resources necessary for war. Arendt 
never mentions the EEC in her published work. However, it is clear from her 
correspondence that she did support the creation of its earlier incarnation, the ECSC. In a 
letter to Jaspers from May 1958, Arendt wrote, ÒI canÕt write about Europe yet. [É] This 
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is a totally god forsaken place except for the presence of the Coal and Steel CommunityÓ 
(in Kohler and Saner, 1993: 351). 
Although these statements are somewhat ambiguous, they suggest that Arendt 
thought that a certain degree of integration in Europe was a step in the right direction 
after 1945. Lars Rensmann (2006: 160, 146) argues that her optimism is based on her 
belief that the creation of the ECSC was a Ògenuinely political [act] of foundation and 
cooperationÓ based on Òthe idea of freedom and public deliberation.Ó Similarly, Owens 
(2009: 39) suggests that Arendt saw the early steps toward integration as the first steps 
towards Òa modest cosmopolitanism of inter-republic law.Ó Both commentators note that 
regional integration is compatible with Arendt support for local councils that break down 
existing political boundaries within Òa post-national democratic-republican model of 
interlinked politiesÓ (Owens, 2010: 97). 
ArendtÕs (1994a: 416-7) endorsement of the Òvery healthy and necessary efforts to 
federate the European nationsÓ also fits with her broader desire to undermine ideas of 
absolute state sovereignty. Writing after the war, she notes, ÒIf men wish to be free, it is 
precisely sovereignty they must renounceÓ (Arendt, 1977b: 165). Although there is much 
debate about how to classify the EU and over how much power it actually wields, it is 
clear that is has indeed succeeded Òshak[ing] the state concept and its sovereigntyÓ 
(Arendt, 1969: 231). From this perspective, it is not the contents or actual operations of 
the EU that are crucial, but the mere fact that the European movement sought to take up 
the past as a resource to generate a Ònew beginning,Ó a new form of Òaction in concertÓ 
that has the potential to give birth to a new form of politics that preserving plurality and 
natality in the postwar world. 
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Interestingly, ArendtÕs fragmentary writings even include something similar to the 
existing European system of subsidiarity, where problems are addressed at the level most 
suitable on a case-by-case basis. In her proposals, Arendt (2007: 400) notes that within 
federalist structures, whether at the state or interstate levels, issues should Òbe resolved 
on the lowest and most promising level of proximity and neighborliness.Ó This proposal 
also bears a striking resemblance to HabermasÕs own more rigid and systematized 
proposals for a postnational constellation based on a political division of labor between 
the state, regional and global levels.  
Moving towards a networked council system of the kind supported by Arendt is 
compatible with the transnational integration of nation-states into continental regimes that 
Habermas recommends. This can be seen in the rise of the Ònew regionalismÓ visible in 
Europe today, where the Basques, Scots and other stateless peoples are gaining influence 
while formally remaining part of their host state (at least for the time being). In this sense, 
the existence of the EU and the framework it provides means that these regions can play a 
role in affairs beyond their own borders without the formal trappings of traditional 
Westphalian sovereignty. Integration therefore does not only mean that powers are being 
delegated ÒupÓ to transnational organizations like the EU Ð they are also frequently being 
devolved ÒdownÓ to more local levels, where a more direct, council-like politics is 
possible. 
These considerations show the benefit of placing Arendt and Habermas in dialogue 
on the issues of memory and political community after World War II. Although they 
approach the problem quite differently, they end up with compatible suggestions for a 
new, pluralist political life based on the power of individuals acting together through 
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communication, not violence. My basic thesis is that this mutual support is the result of 
Arendt and HabermasÕs respective reflections on the meaning of GermanyÕs 
Òunmasterable pastÓ (Maier, 1988) and EuropeÕs broader legacy of war and atrocity. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In considering the continued imperative for change emanating from EuropeÕs 
experience of total war, I have examined the reflections of two of GermanyÕs leading 
postwar political theorists and public intellectuals, Hannah Arendt and Jrgen Habermas. 
Focusing on so much on Germany may seem narrow, but is justifiable given its central 
place in the violence of atrocities of the twentieth century and the indispensible role it has 
played in the origins and development of the EU since 1945. More than any other 
country, the Federal Republic has sought to memorialize and atone for its past. 
West GermanyÕs intellectual, political and societal confrontation with its history is 
even reflected in its language. Since 1945 the German language has developed two 
distinct words to describe the process of dealing with a less than glorious past. The first, 
Geschichtsaufarbeitung, refers to the attempt to Òcome to terms with history.Ó The 
second, Vergangenheitsbewltigung, emphasizes the need to master or overcome the past 
(McCarthy, 2002). This term can even be read as ÒfightingÓ the past, as the verb 
bewltigen comes from the Middle High German word for violence (Gewalt). 
The need to confront its own history has taken on such importance in postwar West 
Germany that even these terms have become politicized. Theodor Adorno (1986), 
HabermasÕs mentor at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, provided his views 
on these concepts in an influential public lecture in 1959. He criticized the term 
Vergangenheitsbewltigung for its implication that history can be Òmastered,Ó since this 
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implies that the past can be dealt with, one and for all. By contrast, he approved of the 
notion of Aufarbeitung, since it introduces the idea of Òworking throughÓ and 
reprocessing old materials into something new and beneficial, instead of merely 
repressing them. As this terminological debate indicates, the events of World War II Ð 
symbolized by the fact that Auschwitz has become the paradigmatic transnational lieu de 
mmoire (Nora, 1984) Ð have placed a particular burden on Germany, as demonstrated by 
its profound influence on both Arendt and Habermas. Politically, it has led the Federal 
Republic to commit itself fully to the European project as a way of putting its history of 
bloody nationalism firmly into the past. 
At the start of the second millennium, the imperative for change arising from the 
events of the first half of the twentieth century has started to wane. There are two main 
reasons for this decline in the motivational power of memory as an imperative for 
change. The first has to do with the important challenge that the fall of communism in 
1989 and the integration of the new member-states from East-Central Europe has posed 
for European memory culture. Whereas Western Europe has followed Germany in 
treating the Holocaust as Òthe European entry ticketÓ (Judt, 2005: 803), collective 
memories on the eastern side of the iron curtain emphasize the experience of communism 
Òas the main evil by way of duration and intensityÓ (Kattago, 2009: 382). Instead of 
emphasizing the Holocaust as unique, the populations of postcommunist Europe have 
sought to place the liberation of 1945 on a par with 1989 based on an interpretation of the 
past that sees ÒNazism and Stalinism as equally evilÓ (Littoz-Monnet, 2012: 1184). 
Internal European divisions over memory signal the EUÕs failure to develop a 
coherent, critical Òculture of rememberingÓ that allows for diversity within a shared, 
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European commitment to confront and learn from the past (see Prutsch, 2013). However, 
this lack of unity is only part of the problem. Perhaps even more important is the fact that 
the generations that experienced and carried personal memories of EuropeÕs age of total 
war have started to pass away (see Verovšek, 2014a). Although the EU and its member-
states (both in the east and west) have created countless memorials to both the crimes of 
fascism and of communism, the shared experience of war and of opposition to 
totalitarianism as a unified phenomenon that sought to make the individual ÒsuperfluousÓ 
(Arendt, 2006: 273) has started to fade way. 
Insofar as the integration project sprung Òdirectly from [EuropeÕs] unique historical 
experienceÓ (Kagan, 2004: 55), the fact that the generations that can directly remember 
the war are no longer active in public life has become more and more problematic. As the 
collective memories of EuropeÕs age of total war have faded, so has support for the EU. 
This is true even in Germany. Given the concurrent economic, monetary, fiscal and 
political crises that have plagued Europe since 2010, giving rise to a new wave of 
populism and Euroscepticism, it is increasingly clear that justifications based on the past 
have lost their appeal. As Paul Scheffer (2012) notes, ÒNightmare images of a possible 
return to previous violent conflicts serve only as a distraction. [É] Beyond Ônever again,Õ 
there is a need for a renewed justification for European integration.Ó 
From a certain perspective, this is understandable. However, it is also unfortunate. 
As a political reality, the EU often falls short of its own goals and the aspirations of its 
most ardent supporters. However, its shortcomings should not make us forget how 
revolutionary the attempt to create a postnational Òcommunity of memoryÓ (Assmann, 
2007) out of the horrors of war actually was. As I have shown, both Arendt and 
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Habermas base their support for the European movement on their experience of the war. 
As Arendt points out: 
Those who emerged to wage war fought against fascism and nothing else. 
And this is not surprising; what is surprising precisely because of its strict, 
almost logical consequence is, rather, that all of these movements at once 
found a positive political slogan which plainly indicated the non-national 
though very popular character of the new struggle. That slogan was simply 
EUROPE (Arendt, 1994b: 112). 
 
Habermas would surely second this sentiment. Like many survivors of the war, 
both Arendt and Habermas saw the European project as a possible solution to the political 
problems that had led Europe into two World Wars within the span of 30 years. Both of 
them also wanted to Òfabricate a memory,Ó to institutionalize the lessons of the war, 
placing them at the center of a new historical consciousness that no longer relied on the 
exclusivist, dangerous ideas of nationalism. This realization is at the root of their mutual 
emphasis on the importance of collective memory and of their support for the European 
project. However, given the recent divides between the East-Central Europe and the West 
over the priority the EU has traditionally given to the Holocaust over the crimes of 
communism, it may well be that ArendtÕs focus the broader remembrance of 
totalitarianism may serve as a better model than HabermasÕs emphasis on the Holocaust 
as the center of modern European political consciousness (Knig et al., 2008). 
This is not to say that either of them would wholeheartedly support what the EU 
has in fact become at the start of the third millennium. Habermas has written extensively 
on the EU in recent years, arguing that the peoples of Europe must take a greater role in 
the organizationÕs functions to combat the organizations growing democratic deficit (see 
Verovšek, 2012). He (Habermas, 2012) has even proposed outlines for a new, bicameral 
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legislature, in which one house of a revised European Parliament would represent the 
peoples of Europe directly, whereas the other would represent the member-states. 
Much like Habermas, Arendt would surely welcome the development of European 
law as a Òstabilizing factorÓ (1969: 79) that protects the rights and liberties that political 
freedom, i.e. the individualÕs capacity for Òacting with one anotherÓ (1998: 180), depends 
on. However, again similar to Habermas, she would also most likely reject the 
institutional form this freedom has taken the actual institutional architecture of the EU. In 
this sense, both thinkers emphasize that the Òinternal connection between law and politics 
must be acknowledgedÓ (Volk, 2017: 7). As a result, in addition to drawing on collective 
memory to bolster support for European integration as an ideal, Arendt and Habermas 
also draw on the legacy of total war to criticize the EU as an actually existing institution 
for its reliance on strict legal rules and technocratic arguments.  
This Arendto-Habermasian reading of the EU is especially important in light of the 
ongoing crisis of the Eurozone and the new surge of populism that has followed in its 
wake. Habermas and Arendt would reject the calls from the nationalist right to 
dismantling or disembowelment of the EU. If anything, the increasing salience of fascist 
symbols from the 1930s makes the preservation of the EU as a community of memory 
that preserves the lessons of EuropeÕs experience of total war all the more necessary and 
urgent. After all, if Europe abandons the EU, the worldÕs most important Òtheoretical 
proving-ground of contemporary liberalismÓ (Anderson, 2009: 133), it may once again 
end up with a decidedly illiberal form of politics on a continent that ought to remember 
the dangerous consequences of embracing nationalistic populism. 
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However, Habermas and Arendt would also surely use this crisis as an opportunity 
to reaffirm the importance of politics and democratic engagement over a technocratic 
reliance on rules to solve what are essentially political problems, such as the legal 
regulations governing the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). From this 
perspective, the economic, monetary and sovereign debt crisis may already have had 
some positive consequences in bringing about a much-needed politicization of debate and 
decision-making at the European level. For example, Luuk van Middelaar (2016: 496, 
501) observes that over the course of these interlocking crises, the vocabulary at the 
European level has shifted. He argues that the leaders and citizens of the EU have 
increasingly realized that it Òworks through power as well as through values and rules Ð 
and it is therefore rediscovering ÔgovernmentÕ alongside Ôgovernance.ÕÓ This puts him on 
what he calls Òthe trail of the Ôreturn to politics.ÕÓ Insofar as the EU is indeed shifting 
from being an organization of legal rules and regulations and becoming one of political 
debate and shared decision-making, this would only bolster its appeal to Habermas and 
Arendt, reaffirming its status as what she called Òthe pardon and the promiseÓ (in Tietze 
and Bielefeld, 2011) of the postwar world. 
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1 HabermasÕs understanding of the past draws most directly on the work of Adorno, 
Benjamin and Freud, particularly the latterÕs argument for the necessity of the patient to 
work through their past in order to deal fully with the present. However, Maurice 
Halbwachs, who was a student of mile Durkheim, is always in the background as well. 
Although Habermas cites him only once to my knowledge (see Habermas, 1984: 418), 
Halbwachs had direct personal and intellectual connections to the Frankfurt School. In 
the interwar period, for instance, he helped the Frankfurt Circle to move the Institute of 
Social Research (Institut fr Sozialforschung) to Geneva in 1933, where it was 
reincorporated as the Socit Internationale de Recherches Sociales (the International 
Society of Social Research). He also intervened to ensure Walter BenjaminÕs release 
from the Vichy internment camp at Nevers in 1940 (see Jay, 1973: 30, 38, 197-8). In his 
correspondence, Benjamin even asks Horkheimer twice to relate his gratitude to 
Halbwachs for this assistance (see Letter #323 dated 30 November 1939 and Letter #325 
dated 15 December in Scholem & Adorno, 1994: 618, 623). This indicates that he knew 
of Halbwach and his role in ensuring his release, but that they most likely were not 
personally acquainted. Although it is impossible to say for certain, it is possible that 
Halbwachs influenced both BenjaminÕs and AdornoÕs understandings of memory, as well 
that of Habermas, both through the work of his predecessors and his own reading. In 
contrast to Habermas, however, it is unlikely that Arendt would have been familiar with 
HalbwachÕs work, as it was only taken up and rediscovered during the Òmemory boomÓ 
of the 1980s after HalbwachÕs early death of dysentery in Buchenwald in 1945. 
2 For Arendt, zōon politikon (ζῷον πολιτικόν in Aristotle) describes man as a political 
being (ein politisches Lebenswesen). She objects strongly to St. Thomas AquinasÕ 
translation of this concept as animal socialis, because Òthis unconscious substitution of 
the social for the political betrays the extent to which the original Greek understanding of 
politics has been lostÓ (Arendt, 1998: 23). 
3 This focus on the importance of the common world explains why Arendt originally 
wanted to give The Human Condition (1958) the title Amor Mundi (Òfor love of the 
worldÓ). This focus on the construction of a common world that we all share is also at the 
center of ArendtÕs interpretation of Immanuel Kant and of her importance to her work. 
Although I am unable to go into these points in detail due to constraints of space, I would 
like to thank one of the reviewers from this journal for calling my attention to these 
important points. 
4 Unfortunately, I do not have the space to expand on this point here. For more on 
BenjaminÕs understanding of history and memory, as well as ArendtÕs interpretation and 
her reflections on his work, see (Benjamin, 1977). 
5 Habermas admits this connection in his essay on Arendt, in (Habermas, 1983: 171-88). 
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